Capacity providers often experience a mismatch between supply and demand that can be partially alleviated while improving revenues by allowing for product upgrades. When prices are fixed and demands are independent, the problem is to decide which customer demands to upgrade to which products and when. We show that a fairness constraint can be imposed without loss of optimality under mild conditions. We also investigate a model that limits upgrades to the next higher quality product, and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for its revenues to be as high as that of any less restricted upgrade model. Resellers of capacity also have an incentive to use upgrades as a mechanism to entice customers to higher quality products with higher commission margins. We show that this practice can be very profitable and that the profits can be much larger than direct commissions from sales would indicate. We then investigate the case where sellers have pricing flexibility and customer demand is driven by a choice model. We derive pricing formulas under the assumption that demand for products follows a multinomial logit model, and we develop an algorithm for finding a global optimal solution to the capacity constrained profit function. For this model we show that neither upgrades nor upsells improve profits when margins are homogenous and there is complete freedom in selecting prices. However, upgrades can improve revenues significantly when sensible business constraints on prices are imposed and when margins are heterogenous.
Introduction
An upgradeable product allows the seller to fulfill it at the same price with a more desirable substitute from a prespecified set of alternative products. For example, most cruise customers who book a cabin without ocean view would gladly accept a free upgrade to an ocean view cabin. Similarly, in the car rental industry a customer may be upgraded to a more prestigious vehicle, and in the airline industry the upgrade may be to a non-stop flight or to a better seat. Upgrades are also common in semiconductor manufacturing where fast chips are sometimes used to fulfill demand for slower chips (Gallego et al. 2006) , and in package delivery and other transportation activities that offer several priority options at differentiated prices. 1 Capacity providers often give upgrades free of charge when it is to their advantage to do so. However, car rental companies such as Hertz are starting to push customers to voluntarily buy up to higher grade products by offering upgrades at attractive prices at the time of fulfillment. Similarly, airlines may offer attractively priced business class upgrades to economy customers either at check-in or just before completing the purchase of an economy e-ticket. We will use the term upsell for upgrades that require a side payment.
Upgrades and upsells are especially useful when there is a mismatch between supply and demand. There are several reasons why capacity mismatches may occur in practice, including forecast errors and strategic supply limits that aim to skim revenues from customers with high willingness to pay. 2 In this paper we will be mainly concerned with mismatches that occur when capacity decisions are fixed for the long run, as is the case for the travel and leisure industries. For example, the number of seats on a plane, the number of hotel rooms of a given size, the number of cruise cabins with a view, and the capacity of the orchestra section of a theater are all fixed and difficult to change in the short run as demand fluctuates over time. Mismatches may occur even if capacity decisions are set judiciously, since demands may suffer from seasonality effects. In fact, such fluctuations suggest that capacity decisions may be made considering peak demand. This is particularly true in revenue management applications where capacity decisions are made for the long run and then demand instances occuring every day can fluctuate significantly from what was predicted.
In this paper we present a family of models to address short term and long term capacity mismatches. For short run mismatches we recommend models that are close to traditional revenue management in that they keep fares as given and try to solve the mismatch problem through capacity allocation. For systematic mismatches we recommend a choice based pricing model that also allows for upsells. For each model considered, we investigate both the case of a primary capacity provider and the case of resellers who may be motivated to upgrade customers to products with larger margins. The models that we present have a nested structure, ranging from formulations close to current revenue management practice to more advanced formulations that are the subject of active research and that some of the most sophisticated users are considering for implementation.
Our first formulation is a generalization of the traditional independent demand model with fixed fares, where the capacity provider gives free upgrades. While limiting, the assumption of independent demand with fixed fares is commonly used in practice and holds approximately in some instances. Menus of fixed fares are often used in competitive environments where companies are reluctant to raise the price of low fare products (as customers may select to go to competitors), and where decreasing the price of higher quality products may start a price war. Under such conditions, companies prefer to keep a menu of fixed fares and solve a proxy of the pricing problem by doing capacity allocation. While the independent demand problem is stochastic in nature, it is common for sophisticated users to solve the corresponding deterministic problem and to use its solutions (either primal or dual) as heuristics for the stochastic formulation. It is well known that such heuristics are asymptotically optimal van Ryzin 1994, 1997) .
For our first formulation we show that upgrades help balance demand and supply by shifting excess capacity of high grade products to low grade products with excess demand. We investigate two upgrade mechanisms. The most flexible mechanism is the full cascading model where upgrades are allowed to any higher quality product. The least flexible mechanism is the limited cascading model where upgrades are allowed only to the next higher quality product. We give necessary and sufficient conditions on the product demands, capacities and prices for the optimal revenue to be the same under the two cascading models. These conditions can be verified ex-ante so the seller knows if there is loss in optimality in using the limited cascading model. When it does not lead to a loss in optimality, the limited cascading model has the advantage of fairness, as it avoids giving higher upgrades to customers selecting lower quality products. When there is loss of optimality, the seller may be tempted to use a more flexible upgrade mechanism to improve revenues. However, such mechanisms may be unfair as they may grant a higher quality upgrade to customer A even though customer B bought a higher quality product. While customers realize that they may be charged different fares depending on their time of purchase and flexibility restrictions, their expectation is still that paying a higher price should give them higher upgrade priority. Therefore, a company's approach to fairness issues is important, and companies should be sensitive to these perceptions. Indeed, Ho and Su (2008) find that social comparison creates a powerful reference point for customers and gives rise to strong peer-induced fairness concerns, for example in the case of a seller interacting with multiple buyers. We show that any flexible upgrade model that satisfies two intuitive properties (transitivity and inductiveness) has an optimal solution that is fair. In particular, we show that the full cascading model is transient and inductive, hence there exists an optimal solution that is fair. Notice that even a company that has little regard for its customers' perception of fairness should prefer a fair solution if it can be obtained at no cost.
We next present a generalization of our first formulation relevant to brokers who sell both their own capacity and capacity owned by primary providers from which they receive commissions. For example, this is the case of large electronic travel agents taking risky positions on inventories. The key motivation here is that different products may have heterogenous margins (our original formulation for capacity providers is the special case of homogeneous margins). With heterogeneous commissions, resellers have an incentive to fulfill demands with higher quality substitute products bringing higher commissions. This practice can significantly improve revenues for resellers, particularly if they own large inventories of high quality products that can be used to fulfill demands for other products with smaller commission margins. 3 Excessive use of upgrades may, however, result in low net sales of low margin products owned by primary providers as these are used to lure customers to higher margin products. Since this may damage the long term relationship with primary providers, our model adds lower bound constraints on net sales for such products. Primary providers aware of their brand value for driving sales of high margin products owned by resellers may thus be in a position either to negotiate lower commissions or to insist on higher sale volumes.
The preceding models take fares as given and use capacity allocation mechanisms to match supply and demand. These models are well aligned with current revenue management practice and are recommended when the capacity mismatch is transient or not very pronounced, for in these cases it is unlikely that customers will adapt strategically to upgrades. On the other hand, if the mismatch between supply and demand is pronounced and persistent, optimal solutions are likely to require the systematic use of upgrades. This may modify customers' expectations, increasing demand for lower quality products while reducing demand for higher quality products, 4 thus creating a downward spiral and exacerbating the capacity mismatch. See Cooper et al. (2006) for the first article to address this issue in the context of traditional revenue management. Since upgrades are routinely practiced in many industries, it is likely that the effect of strategic customers is not large enough to render upgrades unprofitable. While the problem of expectation updates is of interest, we will not address it here. We refer interested readers to Shen and Su (2007) and references therein, who present an extensive review of three literature streams: strategic intertemporal customers, choice modeling and strategic bidder behavior in auctions.
When capacity mismatches are pronounced and persistent, we feel that it is not appropriate to use capacity allocation mechanisms as proxies for implicit price discounts. We recommend instead models that explicitly allow for price adjustments, and we develop a generalization of the network multinomial choice model that has been the subject of a recent and growing literature motivated by the shortcomings of the independent demand models (Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) , Liu and van Ryzin (2007) , Adelman (2007) and Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) ). Our formulation assumes that capacity is fixed, the seller is free to set prices, and demand follows a multinomial consumer choice model. We show that if the product margins are homogeneous (as is the case for primary capacity providers) and the seller has complete freedom to select prices, then neither upgrades nor upsells can improve profits. This result may suggest that upgrades and upsells are only effective as a mechanism to correct for sub-optimal prices. This is false when capacity mismatches are severe, as optimal prices may fail to be quality consistent-higher quality products priced lower than lower quality products. We conclude that with quality consistent pricing constraints or heterogenous margins, upgrades and upsells may still be beneficial even if there is pricing flexibility. This is especially true when margins are not homogeneous, as in the case of resellers.
The multinomial model allows us to compute the conditional probability that a customer will accept a free upgrade and the conditional probability that a consumer will be willing to pay for an upgrade, so the seller can now optimize over both regular and upsell prices. Notice that a formulation that optimizes over both regular and upsell prices can be viewed as a two stage stochastic program with recourse, where the prices for the products are initially set and customers who select lower quality products in short supply may be offered attractively priced upgrades to higher quality products with excess capacity.
Managers should pause at this point and evaluate whether the lift in revenues from upgrades and upsells, relative to the lift in revenues that can be obtained directly through optimal pricing, is sufficiently large to warrant the development of strategic customer behavior. Managers should also think about mechanisms to mitigate such behavior, for example by rewarding loyal customers, internally charging the cost of the upgrades to loyalty budgets, or by targeting for upgrades customers that would normally not purchase the higher quality products in the first place.
In this paper we mostly focus on the analysis of deterministic models that use aggregate expected demands. These models result in deterministic resource allocation and pricing problems that are often referred as fluid models where random demands are replaced by their expectations in both the objective function and the capacity constraints. Fluid models constitute the standard approach to network revenue management because both primal and dual heuristics based on them are asymptotically optimal and very good approximations in practice.
The theoretical justification for looking at fluid models stems from the connection between the primal and dual formulations of the aggregate deterministic model and the corresponding stochastic dynamic control problem. These connections are summarized as follows: (i) The optimal value function of the deterministic primal formulation is an upper bound to the corresponding stochastic formulation. (ii) The solution to the deterministic problem can be converted into an asymptotically optimal heuristic to the corresponding stochastic problems. (iii) The dual of the deterministic formulation stems from a linear approximation to the corresponding stochastic dynamic program and (iv) The dual solution can be converted into an asymptotically optimal bid price heuristic for the corresponding stochastic problem. The reader is referred to van Ryzin (1994, 1997) for claims (i) and (ii), Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2007) and Adelman (2007) for (iii), and Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) 
for (iv).
Aggregating demand over sales horizons is common in practice because it is often difficult to estimate time varying demand rates. In our consulting experience we have found that it is often better to calibrate a parsimonious model based on aggregate demands ignoring the time element, than explicitly considering the time element when demand rates are not time homogenous. Also, parameters of aggregate models are easier to estimate and deterministic models are easier solve. It is often possible to obtain important insights that are very difficult to obtain when working directly with the corresponding stochastic optimal control problem. Focusing on the deterministic models allows us to concentrate on the first order effects of upgrades, upsells and pricing. This paper is related to the literature on multi-product inventory management with substitutable demands. Previous research in this area can be broadly classified into work on customer substitution and on provider-controlled substitution. Customer substitution has been investigated mostly in a retail context, where substitution decisions are made by independent consumers rather than directed by the retailer, who can only indirectly affect customer's choice through the inventory policy (Smith and Agrawal 2000, Mahajan and van Ryzin 2001) .
On the other hand, provider-controlled substitution occurs when a supplier firm chooses to satisfy demand for one product with inventory of another product, to balance uneven inventory levels. Several single period, multi-product versions of the substitution problem in this setting have been extensively studied -e.g., Pasternack and Drezner (1991) find the optimum inventory levels in the case of two substitutable products, while Gurnani and Drezner (2000) investigate an n-product economic order quantity model and determine the optimal length of the order cycle and the optimal order and substitution quantities. Bitran and Dasu (1992) investigate the profit maximization problem in a production setting with stochastic yields, substitutable demands, and jointly produced items. Bitran and Leong (1992) study the related problem of minimizing costs subject to service constraints, in a multi-period multi-product inventory setting with stochastic yields and deterministic downward substitutable demands. Hsu and Bassok (1999) determine the optimal production input and product allocation for the single-period multi-product problem with random yields and downward substitutable random demands. Basok et al. (1999) investigate the deterministic yield version of the single-period multi-product inventory problem with substitutable demands, develop a two-stage profit maximization formulation and show that a greedy allocation policy is optimal. Gallego et al. (2006) consider the multi-period multiproduct problem with random yields and downward substitutable random demands and model it as an inventory cost minimization problem with service constraints for which they develop effective heuristics. Karaesmen and van Ryzin (2004) consider a two stage model for the overbooking problem with substitutable inventory classes, where substitution is only allowed during the second stage. A recent working paper by Shumsky and Zhang (2008) considers a limited cascading upgrade model with fixed fares and non-strategic customers and gives results separating the allocation decision from the upgrade decision which is itself based on protection levels. The authors provide efficient bounds on the protection levels which work well heuristically for large systems. Finally, the literature on cross-selling where upgrades consist of bundling the original product with other ancillary items is also relevant, and we point the reader to the papers by Netessine et al. (2006) who study the problem with and without replenishing opportunities in the event of stockouts and to Aydin and Ziya (2007) who consider a two product problem in detail.
Upgrades and upsells have some similarity to callable products, see Biyalogorsky et al. (1999) , Gallego et al. (2004) and Gallego, Kou and Phillips (2008) , where products can be sold as callable by giving customers an upfront discount and a side payment if and when they are assigned a product in a prespecified set of alternatives. In the case of upgrades there is no side payment. Upsells require a side payment and there is also an issue of timing that is important in stochastic formulations. A customer may be offered an upsell at a certain time and he must decide whether to take it or leave it. Alternatively, a customer may be asked whether he agrees to give the seller the option to upgrade him to a higher quality product at a given price at a later time. If he agrees, the customer will be notified and charged the side payment if and when he is upgraded.
The first contribution of our paper is a generalization of the traditional network revenue management model to explicitly account for upgrades. We first make the assumption that customers always accept upgrades to superior products if they are offered at no extra cost, and we relax this assumption later in the paper when we discuss the multinomial choice model. We consider several upgrade mechanisms, including the limited and the full cascading model. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions under which the two upgrade models yield the same optimal revenue. We also show that it is possible to modify the solution of the full cascading model so that it satisfies a fairness criterion, and that this is also true of any upgrade model that satisfies two conditions (transitivity and inductiveness). We further generalize this model to allow for heterogeneous commission margins relevant to resellers of capacity. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to analyze this problem, although a very recent manuscript (Shumsky and Zhang 2008) studies in detail the limited cascading model.
We next develop a generalization with upgrades of the network revenue management model where demands are driven by a multinomial choice model. We first present an algorithm for finding a global optimal solution to the capacity constrained profit function for the multinomial choice model. This algorithm is of independent interest, given the well-known difficulties of optimizing the profit function even in the unconstrained case. We then show that upgrades are superfluous for primary capacity providers when they have the freedom to select both prices and capacity levels. However, if capacity is fixed for the long run and there is a current mismatch, then complete freedom in pricing may lead to optimal solutions that violate quality consistent pricing. Hence, when this or other business constraints are imposed or when product margins are heterogeneous, upgrades and upsells may be useful even if there is (limited) price freedom. We compute the conditional probability that a customer is willing to pay for upgrades, and we formulate a model where the provider or reseller can optimize over both regular and upsell prices. This formulation relaxes the assumption of the traditional network model that customers accept all free upgrades. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study optimal pricing for the network revenue management model with multinomial demands, and this is a contribution independent of upgrades and upsells. This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we consider formulations for both the primary provider and the reseller's problems under the assumption of independent demand and fixed fares. In Section 3 we extend these formulations to the case where demand follows a consumer choice model and the seller can control prices. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of our results.
Independent Demand Model with Fixed Fares
Consider n products with fixed prices p 1 , . . . , p n whose demands are independent Poisson processes with rates λ j , j = 1, . . . , n, over a sales horizon of length T . We assume that the n products consume m resources according to the m × n incidence matrix A, so that the k-th column of A, say A k , denotes the vector of resources consumed by product k. 5 Let c ∈ Z m + be the vector of capacities. We assume that the seller has a sunk investment on c and that it is not possible to acquire more capacity during the sales horizon. Without loss of generality we assume that the salvage value of capacity is zero. This setting is standard, and the problem consists in dynamically assigning capacity to products to maximize expected revenues (Gallego and van Ryzin 1997) .
We assume that the first u products, say {1, . . . , u}, with u < n are upgradeable. The set of upgrades available to the k-th upgradeable product is denoted by U k . The seller guarantees that a customer who purchases the k-th product will be assigned some alternative
An upgrade occurs when a product in set U k is used to fulfill an order for product k. We assume that the products are ordered, so that j ∈ V k implies that j ≥ k.
In this section we consider two upgrade mechanisms. The first mechanism requires upgrades to be decided at the time of sale, while the second postpones upgrades until the end of the horizon.
Let V (x, t) be the expected revenue when upgrades are decided at the time of sale, when the vector of capacity is x and the time to go is t. Then V (x, t) satisfies the following Hamilton Jacobi Belman (HJB) equation, whose derivation we prove in the Appendix:
with boundary conditions V (x, 0) = V (0, t) = 0, where
Notice that at the time of sale the seller can fulfill a demand for product k with the product j ∈ V k with the lowest displacement cost ∆ j V (x, t).
To formulate the problem when upgrades are postponed we need to track the sales of upgradeable products, and this requires expanding the state space by adding the vector of commitments y ∈ Z u + . The resulting HJB equation whose derivation we prove in the Appendix, is given by
where
where 1 k is a vector of dimension u with one in component k and zeros elsewhere. At the end of the horizon when t = 0, we need to decide whether there exists a feasible allocation of the accepted upgradeable products y with the remaining capacity x. Let A denote the feasible set, described explicitly in the Appendix. Then (x, y) ∈ A if x ≥ 0 and there exists a feasible allocation of upgrades. The boundary conditions are given by V (x, y, 0) = 0 if (x, y) ∈ A, and V (x, y, 0) = −∞ otherwise.
Primary Provider's Model
In the Appendix we use approximate dynamic programming with affine functions to obtain linear programs whose value functions W (c, 0, T ) and W (c, T ) are respectively upper bounds for V (c, 0, T ) and V (c, T ). Here we make explicit the connection between these linear programs and the following fluid model. Consider the deterministic problem where aggregate demands are equal to their expectations d j = λ j T . Let z k,j be the number of units that are sold as product k and fulfilled with product j ∈ V k for all k ∈ {1, . . . , u}.
Notice that the matrix Z = (z k,j ) is upper triangular with elements z k,j = 0 for j / ∈ V k . Then j∈V k z k,j and l:k∈V l z l,k are, respectively, the number of units of product k that are sold and the number of units of product k that are used after upgrades.
The capacity provider needs to decide how many units of each product to sell and how many units to upgrade. His decision problem can be formulated as the following LP:
The following result holds.
Proof. In the Appendix we show that formulation (3) is precisely the dual of the linear program that results from using an affine approximation of the dynamic program for the case where upgrades are postponed until the end of the horizon. This implies that R = W (c, 0, T ). We also show in the Appendix that the affine approximations result in the same value function regardless of whether upgrades are postponed or given at the time of sale, so W (c, 0, T ) = W (c, T ). Since approximate dynamic programming results in a minimization problem that restricts the value functions, it follows that
The special case where all non-diagonal elements are zero reduces to the classical deterministic network linear programming. Formulation (3) provides a mechanism to shift demand to higher grade products and this may be quite helpful if the fare structure results in excess demand for lower grade products and extra capacity for higher grade products.
Throughout the paper we will present a number of examples based on the data of Example 2.1 below. This will allow us to compare the benefits of using only upgrades to the benefits of using pricing, upgrades and upsells. 
Primal and Dual Heuristics
The solution to the deterministic problem can be used to develop both primal and dual based heuristics for the stochastic problem. A simple-minded, primal based heuristic would be to directly use the optimal deterministic allocation z. Under this heuristic, the first ten customers for product 1 will get product 1, the next two customers are upgraded to product 2, the next two are upgraded to product 4, and additional product 1 customers are turned away. Similarly, the first ten customers for product 2 will get product 2, the next four receive product 3, and additional product 2 customers are turned away. This allocation ignores that there are four additional units of product 4 and eleven additional units of product 5. To improve the expected revenue, we can allocate excess capacity by finding the products with the largest marginal contributions. For example, allocating one more unit to product 5 leads to expected marginal contribution of $150 · P (D 5 ≥ 24) = $66.73. This heuristic to allocate excess capacity results in the allocation matrix 
Simulating the revenue of 250,000 repetitions using z h resulted in sample average revenue $10,038.91 with standard error $1.84. This revenue is 96.6% of the deterministic upper bound, with the optimal expected revenue between the performance of the heuristic and the upper bound. Repeating the simulation after scaling capacities and demand by a factor of 10 and finding the best allocation of the residual capacity results in an average revenue of $103,849.15 with a standard error of $4.85; this revenue is 99.95% of the deterministic upper bound. The purpose of running the simulation for z h is to show that even a simple approach enjoys the asymptotic optimality properties described in the Introduction. Of course, more sophisticated online heuristics that update allocations as demands unfold may perform even better.
Let µ ≥ 0 be the vector of dual prices for the capacity constraints in the linear program (3). Let ν k = min j∈V k µ A j . A dual based heuristic consists in accepting a request for product k ∈ {1, . . . , u} at state (x, y) if p k ≥ ν k and (x, y ) ∈ A, where y j = y j for j = k and y k = y k + 1. Otherwise, reject the request. Accept a request for product
Otherwise, reject the request. This heuristic postpones the allocation until the end of the horizon, and it is possible to show that it is asymptotically optimal using the results in Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) . In the Appendix we also provide a heuristic for the case where upgrades are decided at the time of sale.
Fairness in Upgrades
Notice that in the deterministic solution of Example 2.1 some customers who purchased product 1 are upgraded to product 4, while none of the customers who purchased product 3 are upgraded. This raises the issue of fairness. While several definitions of fairness are possible, here we take the view that it is fair to give upgrade priority to customers who purchase higher quality products. Intuitively, a solution is fair if all product j ∈ U k customers have priority in upgrades relative to all product k customers. To formalize this, let
be the indices of the lowest and the highest quality products that product k customers are assigned to.
Definition 2.1 An optimal solution z to problem (3) is fair if j(k)
≤ i(l), for all l ∈ U k , k = 1, . . . ,
u, that is if all customers who purchase a product have priority in upgrades relative to all other customers who purchased an inferior product.
Let R f be the optimal revenue subject to the fairness constraint. In general, R f ≤ R and a strict inequality is possible as fair solutions are more constrained. We next give a definition and a proposition that shows when the fairness constraint can be imposed without loss of optimality. Proof. Let z be any optimal solution to problem (3). If z is not already fair, the following steps will produce a fair solution with the same revenue.
Definition 2.2 An upgrade model is transitive if
Step 0: Set k = 1.
Step 1:
and repeat this step; otherwise go to Step 2.
Step 2:
, and demote the same number of units of product k from j(k) to i(l k ). Recompute j(k) and i(l k ), and go to Step 1.
Every visit to
Step 2 corrects a detected violation of the fairness property while keeping the solution feasible and the revenue constant. Note that, since
is a potential upgrade for product l k customers, and it is possible to upgrade min (z k,j(k) 
is a potential upgrade for product k customers, and it is possible to demote min (z k,j(k) 
A special case of upgrades is the full cascading model (Huh, 2007, personal communication) , where U k = {k + 1, . . . , n} for k ∈ {1, . . . , u}. Notice that the full cascading model is both inductive and transitive so we can impose the fairness constraint without loss of optimality.
Another special case of upgrade models is the limited cascading model, where U k = {k+1} for k ∈ {1, . . . , u}. Notice that this model is inherently fair and it is often used by airlines. The next subsection addresses the question of when this model can be used without loss of optimality.
Optimality of the Limited Cascading Model
The limited cascading model is a strategy often followed in practice -for example, British Airways upgrades tickets only to the next higher fare class. Thus, for example, a premier economy ticket can be upgraded to business class, but not to first class. Let R L be the optimal revenue under the limited cascading model and let R F be the optimal revenue under the full cascading model. We see that R L = R F in Examples 2.1 and 2.2. This is not a coincidence, as it is often possible to limit upgrades to U k = {k + 1} without loss of optimality, and in the process to distribute upgrades among a larger number of more deserving customers, i.e., customers who paid more to buy a higher quality product. To provide precise necessary and sufficient conditions for R L = R F , we now introduce two data dependent sequences and a definition.
. . , 1. f k represents the maximum demand for products j ≤ k that spills over and could be fulfilled by upgrades to U k under the full cascading model. Also, g k represents the maximum surplus capacity from products in V k that may be used to upgrade products 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 under the full cascading model.
Definition 2.3 Pricing is quality consistent if
The derivation of necessary and sufficient conditions requires the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 Consider the full cascading model with A = I and quality consistent pricing. Then there exists a fair optimal solution z such that for all k = 1, . . . , n, we have either
Proof. Let z be a fair optimal solution for the full cascading model problem. Such a solution exists by Proposition 2.1. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and assume that j∈V k z k,j < d k and let l < k be the index that maximizes j(l). Assume that j(l) ≥ k. By fairness we know that j(l) ≤ i(k). Also, since the model is full cascading, k ∈ U l and j(l) ∈ V k . We can therefore modify the solution by reducing z l,j(l) and increasing z k,j(l) by min (z l,j(l) , d k − j z k,j ) > 0 while preserving fairness. Since pricing is quality consistent and k ∈ U l , we have p k ≥ p l so the new solution preserves optimality. After the modification, either j∈V k z k,j = d k or z l,j(l) = 0. If the former case holds, then we are done. Otherwise we search for the index l < k that maximizes j(l). If j(l) < k we are done. Otherwise, we can repeat the procedure until we either satisfy all demand for product k or we have j(l) < k for all l < k.
Proposition 2.2 If A = I, prices are positive and quality consistent, then R
Proof. Assume R L = R F and that both f k > c k+1 and 
Let z be a fair optimal solution to problem (3) under the full cascading upgrade model. Such a solution exists by Proposition 2.1, since A = I and the full cascading model is both inductive and transitive. If j(k) ≤ k + 1 for all k = 1, . . . , u, then z also satisfies the limited cascading condition and there is nothing to prove.
Otherwise, we construct from z a new solution that satisfies the limited cascading condition without loss of optimality. Let k be the smallest index product for which j(k) > k + 1. Since the solution z is fair, we have i(k + 1) ≥ j(k) > k + 1, so all units of product k + 1 that are sold are upgraded to k + 2, . . . , n. This implies that all product k + 1 capacity c k+1 is available to upgrade products 1, 2, . . . , k. Notice also that
, so the capacity of product k + 1 (all of which is available) is enough to upgrade any spilled demand from products 1, 2, . . . , k. Since
, it is possible to demote z k,l units of product k from l to k+1 without loss of optimality, for all l = k + 2, . . . , j(k) with z k,l > 0. As a result the new value of j(k) will now be k + 1. If j(l) ≤ l + 1 for all l ≤ u then we are done. Otherwise we find the smallest index product for which j(k) > k + 1 and repeat the procedure. Notice that at every iteration the index k is strictly increasing so the procedure terminates in at most u iterations, ending with a new solution which satisfies the limited cascading condition and has
However, since product k consumes at least one unit of the surplus capacity of products {k + 2, . . . , n}, the surplus of these products is insufficient to satisfy the demand for product k +1. This forces z k+1,k+1 > 0 implying that i(k +1) = k +1 < j(k) but this contradicts the assumption that z is fair. This implies that j(k)
The intuition behind Proposition 2.2 is the following. The limited and the full cascading models result in the same optimal revenue if it is possible to transform an optimal full cascading solution by reassigning upgrades for every upgradeable product to only the next quality product. As the proof shows, this is possible if either the maximum spilled over demand for products j ≤ k is smaller than the capacity for product k +1 (thus it can always be fulfilled with this capacity), or if the maximum surplus capacity from products in V k+2 is smaller than the demand for product k + 1 and thus any optimal solution will fully allocate this capacity to product k + 1 customers rather than to customers who purchased inferior products. This second condition in particular is often fulfilled in practice (for example, for booking classes in an airplane), so that imposing a limited cascading upgrade mechanism would not result in a loss in revenue. This is, in fact, current practice in the airline industry.
Looking at the data in Example 2.1 we see that condition f k ≤ c k+1 is satisfied for all k = 1, . . . , u, so we know ex-ante that R F = R L , as verified in Example 2.2. In this case we recommend using the limited cascading model because its solution is guaranteed to satisfy the fairness criterion.
Reseller's Model
Another motivation to upgrade products arises in the case of resellers of capacity. In practice, there are two different mechanisms for setting commissions for resellers. First, commissions can be based on a certain percentage of the total sales volume, and the commision percentage may increase as the sales volume increases. Second, the reseller may receive commisions per unit of product sold, and the commision margins may be heterogenous for different products. In this paper we focus on the second case which is relevant, for example, for ticket consolidators who can fulfill demand either with their own inventory or with inventory owned by primary providers or other consolidators.
For some transactions, the reseller may be able to fulfil a request for a low margin product with another product of equal or higher quality that yields a higher commission. This substitution often happens in on-line brokering of perishable capacity, but it is also common in a subtler way in regular retail environments where customers are steered to higher margin products through coupons or recommendations. As an illustration we will soon revisit Example 2.1 for a reseller that owns products 3 and 5 but gets only a 10% commission margin on the other products. We will see that access to commission products improves the profits of the reseller by 41%, even though direct sales of such products only account for a 5% improvement in profits.
To formulate the upgrade problem with commissions we need additional notation. As-sume that the seller obtains a net benefit equal to q k = m k p k per unit of product k sold, where m k ∈ [0, 1] is the margin for product k. For convenience, letq k = (1 − m k )p k be the part of the fare p k that the seller does not keep, e.g., the part that goes to the primary provider. Thus, if product k ≤ u is not upgraded, the seller obtains q k and passes throughq k to the primary provider. However, if a request for product k is upgraded to product j ∈ U k , then the reseller keeps p k but has to pass throughq j to the primary provider of product j. Thus, the revenue from upgrading product
With this notation, the decision problem for the reseller is equivalent to the following LP: max
The reseller now has an incentive to upgrade k to j ∈ U k wheneverq k >q j , i.e., whenever he can reduce the amount he must pass through to a primary provider. Formulation (4), as stated, can lead to a situation where certain products are upgraded frequently, resulting in low net sales of products with low commissions. The providers of such products may decide to withdraw them, making the situation worse rather than better for the reseller. The formulation can be modified by imposing a lower bound on the number of sales fulfilled with a given product, e.g., by imposing constraints of the form z k,k ≥ l k to guarantee that at least l k units of product k will be sold without substitution. 
Consumer Choice Model
Until now we have assumed that prices are fixed. In this section we allow the seller to control prices, and we assume that demand for products depends on the vector of prices and other quality attributes. We will continue to assume that customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ. Given a vector of prices p we will assume that the probability that a customer selects product i is given by
where a i (p) is an attraction function. We focus our attention on the multinomial logit (MNL) model given by the choice a i (p) = e γ(α i −p i ) where a o , γ, and α i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are constants. The underlying assumption here is that customer preferences correspond to a random utility model, where the deterministic component is a linear function of product attributes and customer characteristics, the stochastic component has a Gumbel distribution with parameter γ, and the term a o corresponds to the attractiveness of the outside alternative (Greene 2002) .
Let λ i (p) = λπ i (p) be the rate at which customers purchase product i at price p and
In the Appendix we formulate the stochastic optimal control problem of dynamically adjusting prices over the sales horizon to maximize expected revenues. Using an affine approximation to the value function of the stochastic optimal control problem leads to the following fluid formulation with fixed prices, whose value is an upper bound on the expected revenues that can be obtained by solving the dynamic pricing stochastic optimal control problem:
This formulation is similar to that presented in Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) , with three differences -here we formulate the problem with prices as decision variables instead of demand intensities, we allow for margins, and we use a choice model for the product demand. The problem of maximizing the MNL profit function with or without constraints is a topic of independent interest. It is well known that the function in (5) is not concave even in the case of a single product and a demand model governed by a single MNL specification. Hanson and Martin (1996) proposed a path following heuristic to maximize an unconstrained problem where demand is a mixture of several MNL models. In contrast, we are dealing here with a capacity constrained problem for a single MNL model. We present an algorithm that finds a global optimal solution to the constrained single MNL profit function. Given the known difficulties in optimizing the profit function even in the unconstrained case with a single MNL, this algorithm is a contribution of independent interest. Naturally, the algorithm also solves the unconstrained problem. Indeed, as we shall soon discuss, it starts by finding a globally optimal solution to the unconstrained problem.
To explain the core idea of our technique we need to introduce the Lagrangian L(p, µ) = µ c + (p − µ A)d(p). We show that for any fixed vector µ there is a unique finite solution, say p(µ), that maximizes L(p, µ) over p ≥ 0. The computation of p(µ)
requires only a line search for a finite root that is guaranteed to exist, be positive and be unique. We then use a column generation procedure to solve min µ≥0 L(p(µ), µ) and show that the resulting price vector p * = p(µ * ) is a global optimal solution to (5). Each step of the column generation algorithm requires solving a finite dimensional linear program that generates a dual vector µ and a potential new column for the LP based on p(µ) and d(p(µ)). If the column already exists the procedure terminates, otherwise a new LP is solved with the updated column and the procedure is repeated.
The following proposition gives more details about solving the inner optimization problem min p≥0 L(p, µ).
Proposition 3.1 For any µ ≥ 0 there is a finite vector p(µ) that globally maximizes L(p, µ)
and θ(µ) is the unique positive scalar root of
Proof. To see that any solution to (6) is bounded away from zero, assume that p is optimal and that p k = 0 for some product k. Increasing p k to > 0 improves the revenue from product k, decreases the consumption of resources required by product k, and increases the demand for all the other products. This results in a relaxed constrained optimization problem over products other than k, with higher revenue function, higher demand and more resources. Such a program has a solution with revenue at least as high. Consequently, there is an optimal solution in n ++ , i.e., with p k > 0 for all k. Let P be the set of vectors p ∈ n ++ such that αp is feasible for some positive α < ∞. Any p ∈ n ++ that is not in P includes at least one product that consumes a resource i with c i = 0. We can drop such products without loss of optimality, and assume without loss of generality that P = n ++ . Notice that we are not requiring all the components of c to be positive, but if they are all positive then P = n ++ without the need to delete any products. Let µ ∈ m + be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capacity constraint. The Lagrangian is
To obtain the first order conditions for p, we use the well known result that under the multinomial logit choice model we have
Given µ, the first order condition with respect to p j is given by
Using equations (8) and (9) and some algebra, we see that
Roots of L j (p, µ) = 0 can be obtained by either setting the inner square bracket term in (10) to zero, resulting in
or by setting d j (p) = 0 which requires p j = ∞.
Multiple solutions to the first order conditions L j (p, µ) = 0, j = 1, . . . , n can be obtained by identifying the set, say F , of products satisfying equations (11) and the complement satisfying p j = ∞, j / ∈ F .
We will now show that for any non-empty subset F ⊂ {1, . . . , n} there is a unique vector p(µ|F ) satisfying (11) for j ∈ F and p j (µ|F ) = ∞ for j / ∈ F . We will further show that for j ∈ F we have p j (µ|F ) = p j (µ, θ F ), where
and θ F is the unique positive root of
Moreover, we will show that
and that
Finally, we will show that θ F is maximized by setting F = N = {1, . . . , n}.
Fix µ ≥ 0 and notice that if there is a solution to (11) for j ∈ F it must be of the form (12) where θ F is a root of (13). To see that a root exists, notice that the left hand side is positive and strictly decreasing in θ whereas the right hand side increases to infinity in θ starting from θ = 0. Since both functions are continuous, there exists exactly one finite positive root. To verify (14) notice that
Multiplying by π j and adding over j ∈ F we obtain
Solving for θ F , expression (14) follows after a little algebra. Now
where adding terms j / ∈ F does not alter the equation since π j (p(µ|F )) = 0 for j / ∈ F . Also,
verifying (15).
Consider now a subset F with k / ∈ F and let F + = F ∪{k}. We will show that θ
This shows that among all the 2 n solutions that satisfy the first order equations the solution with the largest value function corresponds to the full set F = N = {1, . . . , n}. Moreover, since the solution to the problem max p≥0 L(p, µ) is bounded away from zero, it follows that any maximizer or minimizer must satisfy the first order necessary conditions. Since p(µ) = p(µ|N ) results in the largest value function among the 2 n solutions to the first order conditions, it must be the global optimizer. It is also easy to verify that the Hessian at p(µ) is negative definite. Indeed, the Hessian matrix is given by
for k = j, and by
Thus, since L j (p, µ) = 0 at p(µ) for all j, the Hessian matrix is diagonal with elements L jj (p, µ) = −m j d j (p), so it is negative definite.
To explain the column generation algorithm for solving the outer optimization problem min µ≥0 L(p(µ), µ), we need to introduce some additional notation. Let G be a finite set of non-negative n-dimensional price vectors and for every p l ∈ G let λ l = λ(p l ) = λπ(p l ) be the corresponding vector of arrival rates and r l = p l λ l the corresponding revenue rate. We will slightly abuse notation and use G to denote both the set of vectors and the set of indices l such that p l ∈ G.
Consider now the linear program P G :
Given the vectors in G the program P G determines the optimal length of time that the price vector p l , l ∈ G should be offered during the sales horizon [0, T ] . Consider the dual program D G : min µ c + βT
and let µ G and β G solve the dual problem. We show in the Appendix that
Let p G be the vector in G that achieves the maximum in (16) so
and notice that β(µ G ) ≥ β G since the former is optimized over a larger set.
The following proposition characterizes the solution to min µ≥0 L(p(µ), µ).
the problem min µ≥0 L(p(µ), µ) and the corresponding price vector p G = p(µ G ) solves problem (5).
Proof. Suppose µ G and β G solve D G . Then it must be that
since the objective function is increasing in β. We will first show that
To see this, suppose that the right hand side is negative. Then there exists > 0 such that
But then the vector µ = (1 − )µ G and β = 0 is a better feasible solution to the dual problem, contradicting the optimality of µ G and β G .
Suppose that p G achieves the maximum in the formula for β G , so that
We will show that a solution to the primal problem P G consists in pricing at p G during the entire horizon [0, T ] . To see this, let d G = λ G T and notice that the value of the dual D G is given by
By complementary slackness c − Ad G ≥ 0 and µ G (c − Ad G ) = 0, so the value of the dual is p G d G and this corresponds to the feasible primal solution t G = T and t l = 0 for all other values of l. By strong duality, this solution is optimal for the primal problem P G as claimed.
Clearly β G ≤ β(µ G ) since we are optimizing over all p ≥ 0 and not merely over the vectors
We now show that if
Since c − Ad G ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0, we know that µ (c − Ad G ) ≥ 0 so the best we can hope for is to find a vector µ that makes µ (c − Ad G ) = 0. However, we already know that µ = µ G does exactly this, hence µ G is optimal.
We now show that p G solves max p≥0 L(p, µ G ). This follows because it is equivalent to finding p ≥ 0 to maximize (p − µ G A)d(p), but the unique solution to this problem is
We can now describe the algorithm in detail.
Step 0: Let µ = 0 and compute p(0) by finding the root of equation (7) Step 1: Solve program D G to obtain µ G and β G .
Step 2: Compute the vector p(µ G ) by finding the root of equation (7) for µ = µ G and substituting in equation (6).
Otherwise add p(µ G ) to G and go to Step 1.
From (6) we see that any two products i, j with A i = A j and equal margins m i = m j are priced equally by (6) even if α i > α j , so the MNL demand model does not lead to higher prices for higher quality products that consume the same resources and have the same margins. The common price, p i = p j , however, can be shown to be increasing in both α i and α j . Notice also that (6) may price a lower quality product, say k, higher than a higher quality product, say j. This may happen if m k < m j and µ A k ≥ µ A j , or if µ A k > µ A j and m k ≤ m j . For this reason, imposing quality consistent pricing constraints p k ≤ p j , for j ∈ U k may lead to lower revenues and to a situation where upgrades are helpful. 6
Notice that the second term in (6) is non-negative and is inversely proportional to γa o . Thus the price will be high if γ is small and if the outside alternative a o is unattractive. Likewise, the price will be higher when the commission m k is smaller. This makes sense, since increasing the price also increases the unit revenue m k p k while making other products more attractive. Formula (6) extends to the competitive setting where a o includes the attraction of competitors' products. The implicit function theorem yields
so an increase in the price of product k leads to a decrease in the price of product j that is proportional to the product of the ratio of the margins by the ratio of the market share of product k to the market share of product j and the outside alternative. Similar equations can be derived to find the sensitivity of the prices to changes in the attractiveness of the outside alternative.
Upgrades and Upsells
In this section we will add upgrades and upsells to the model. To do this, we need to define formally what we mean by an upsell. Suppose that a customer selects product k ≤ u. There is a positive probability that the customer will be willing to pay a total of ν k,j < p j for an upgrade to product j ∈ U k . 7 This situation is considered an upgrade, or a free upsell, if ν k,j = p k . A positive upsell occurs if ν k,j > p k since the customer needs to pay ν k,j − p k > 0 more to upgrade to product j ∈ U k . A negative upsell occurs if ν k,j < p k and in this case the provider offers p k − ν k,j > 0 as an incentive for the customer to upgrade to product j ∈ U k . A negative upsell cannot contribute directly to increased revenues since a payment is made to the customer. However, just as free upgrades are helpful in shifting demand from product k to product j when the marginal value of product j is low, negative upsells increase the probability of upgrades. Lowering the price increases the probability that customers will accept the upgrade, as the customers' preference for products may be misaligned with the provider's classification of quality. Indeed, each customer has latent preferences for products which are not simply functions of price or other quality attributes. Such preferences may drive the customer's choice of a lower quality product in the first place, and in this case a financial compensation may naturally be needed to induce the upgrade.
Suppose that margins are homogenous and p is the vector of optimal prices without upgrades. The following result shows that revenues cannot be improved by using upsells.
Proposition 3.3 Upsells cannot improve revenues when margins are homogeneous and the price vector p is a solution to problem (5).
Proof. If m k = m for all k, then optimal prices satisfy
with µ ≥ 0 complementary slack with the capacity constraint.
Suppose that p k < p j and that a customer who selects product k is offered product j ∈ U k at price ν k,j . The customer will reject the offer if ν k,j ≥ p j . On the other hand, there is a positive probability that he accepts the upgrade if ν k,j < p j . For the upgrade to be feasible, all resources i ∈ T = {i : A ij > A ik } must be available so by complementary slackness µ i = 0 for i ∈ T . Hence µ A j ≤ µ A k , and by (17) we have p j ≤ p k contradicting the assumption that p k < p j . On the other hand, if p j < p k any feasible upgrade must be priced at ν k,j ≤ p j < p k but this leads to a loss.
This negative result suggests that upsells are only useful to correct for suboptimal prices when margins are homogeneous. However, the presence of simple business rules such as quality consistent pricing may be enough to invalidate this negative result. Moreover, upsells can be very useful in the presence of sales constraints and when margins are not homogeneous.
Formulation with Upgrades
We now formulate the problem with upgrades where we allow the seller to offer customers of product k the option of upgrading to product j ∈ U k at price ν k,j . We impose the condition ν k,j < p j , as customers will choose not to upgrade otherwise. We do not, however, impose the condition ν k,j ≥ p k . This allows the seller to offer negative upgrades, e.g., to pay customers to induce upgrades.
Let π k,j (ν k,j ) be the conditional probability that the customer chooses to upgrade to product j ∈ U k at price ν k,j ≤ p j , given that he had selected product k at price p k . If the upgrade is accepted, the seller receives ν k,j from the customer and paysq j = (1 − m j )p j to the provider of product j, so the seller nets ν k,j −q j with probability π k,j (ν k,j ). Otherwise, with probability 1 − π k,j (ν k,j ) the provider receives q k , so the expected revenue from each offer to upgrade to product j ∈ U k is
We also need to modify the capacity constraints. As before, j∈V k z k,j is the total number of product k units sold. To compute the net sales of product k, i.e., the number of units of product k consumed after upgrades, we first sum over the products intended for product k, namely l:k∈V l z l,k π l,k (ν l,k ), and then over the upgrades rejected by customers, namely j∈U k z k,j (1 − π k,j (ν k,j ) ). This results in the expected capacity consumption, which must be smaller than the available capacity c. With this notation, the pricing problem with the choice model is given by
Lower bounds on net sales can be modeled by constraints of the form
It is also possible to add pricing constraints of the form
We now derive closed form expressions for π k,j (ν k,j ). The probability that product k is selected when the price vector is p is given by
. The probability that the customer agrees to buy product j at ν k,j ≤ p j given that product k was initially selected is given by
. We can exploit the fact that
γ(α j −p j ) to write the probability as
Notice that π k,j (p j ) = 0 reflecting the fact that the customer prefers product k at price
Experiments for the Choice Model
In this subsection we discuss several numerical examples in order to illustrate the results from the preceding sections. The optimization problem (18) has n price variables, u k=1 |U k | price upgrade variables, and n k=1 |V k | capacity allocation variables. While the problem is large and complex, we used Excel Solver to test the examples below and we were able to obtain what appears to be a unique solution for prices at very modest computational times (less than a minute).
Example 3.1 Assume that product prices are as in Example 2.1, and that demand comes from a choice model with a o = 1, 000, α 1 = 260, α 2 = 270, α 3 = 282, α 4 = 300, α 5 = 315, γ = 0.1 and M = 82. This choice of parameters implies that product demands are also as in Example 2.1, but now they are no longer independent. If we assume that upgrades are free (ν k,j respectively $199.11, $198.79, $198.80, $215.14 and $224.84 . If demand has a Poisson distribution, then we need to adapt the deterministic solution as a heuristic to the corresponding intractable stochastic model. A straightforward implementation would offer the first five product 2 customers upgrades to product 3, the next product 2 customer would be offered an upgrade to product 5, and additional product 2 customers would be rejected. Similarly, the first seven product 4 customers would be offered upgrades to product 5, with additional product 4 customers rejected. Just as in Example 2.1, this heuristic leaves product 4 capacity under-utilized. Indeed, the expected utilization is only 4.42 but capacity is 20. As a result, additional revenue can be obtained by allowing additional customers to upgrade to product 4. Here we allow 13 customers for products k = 1, 2, 4 to upgrade to product 4 at price ν k,4 = p k . The restriction ensures that utilization does not exceed capacity. The corresponding allocation used was Simulating 250,000 repetitions of this simple allocation scheme resulted in sample average revenue $12,383.29 with standard error $2.87. This revenue is 97.1% of the deterministic upper bound, and the optimal revenue lies between the performance of the heuristic and the upper bound.
Repeating the simulation after scaling capacities and demand by a factor of 10 and finding the best allocation of the residual capacity, results in an average revenue of $127,727.09 with a standard error of $7.85. Notice that this revenue is 99.8% of the deterministic upper bound.
Again, more sophisticated on-line heuristics can be used, but a simple implementation of the deterministic solution captures most of the expected revenues when demands are stochastic. ($189.87, $204.98, $206.56, $232.10, $233.24 
Conclusions
Under the assumptions of independent demands for products with fixed fares, upgrades help balance demand and supply by shifting excess capacity from high quality products to lower quality products. We presented a fairness criterion that gives upgrade priority to customers purchasing higher quality products. We show under mild conditions that restricting the solutions to be fair results in no loss of optimality. Fairness is easy to ensure by allocating upgrades according to a limited cascading model, which only allows upgrades to the next higher product. In general, this may result in a loss of revenue relative to the full cascading model which allows upgrades to any higher quality product. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for the limited cascading model to result in the same optimal revenue as the full cascading model. These conditions are only dependent on data, so they can be checked for an ex-ante decision on which upgrade model is best to use.
We also presented a formulation where the motivation for upgrades may be heterogenous margins enjoyed by a reseller, and we argued that the value that primary capacity providers bring to such retailers may be much larger than the net commissions received by the reseller.
Under the less restrictive assumptions of a choice based demand model, customers no longer accept a free upgrade with probability one as their preferences are now conditioned upon their first choice of product. As a result, more upgrade attempts may be needed to achieve a target number of upgrades. We show that upsells are not helpful if commission margins are homogeneous and optimal prices are used. However, upgrades and upsells can lead to significant improvements in revenue even under homogenous margins, when there are business constraints on prices or on sales volumes. In such cases it may even be optimal for the capacity provider to pay some customers to upgrade to better products. Although this finding may seem counterintuitive at first sight, it can be explained by the fact that some better products may have lower marginal value for the customer.
The upgrades and upsells models that we develop in this paper can also be seen as general cases of bundled products and unbundled ancillary services. In particular, any capacity provider that unbundles services and then sells the ancillary products to recreate bundles can benefit from our upsell models. This practice is quite common in many industries. For example, Air Canada offers upsells but also sells bundled products and charges for ancillary products. Some of the categories offered are Tango, Tango Plus, Latitude and Executive. Among these, Tango is the most restricted both in terms of traveling and purchasing constraints, whereas Tango Plus is a bundle of Tango with a meal and luggage service. Latitude may have some refundability options and fewer traveling and purchasing restrictions, while Executive is unrestricted coach with meal and luggage services.
The use of the multinomial choice model for pricing bundled products is also related to implications of consumer behavior theories. For example, Ariely (2008) reports an internet ad for the Economist magazine, offering an online subscription for $59.00, a print subscription for $125.00, and a bundle of online and print subscriptions for $125.00. Pricing the bundled and the print only subscriptions equally may exploit predictably irrational decisions by offering an incentive to purchase the bundled product to customers who otherwise would only buy the less expensive internet option. But the equal price for the bundle and for the print only subscription is in fact also consistent with pricing strategies based on the multinomial logit model. Indeed, if the dual price for the print version is µ 1 and the dual price for the internet version is µ 2 = 0, then the price of the bundled product will be the same as the price of the print version and higher than the price of the internet version. This pricing strategy therefore does not necessarily come from the desire of exploiting human predictably irrational decisions, but from an economic model where consumers may be uncertain of valuations.
In practice, the timing of upgrades and upsells over the booking horizon is an issue to be considered in designing mechanisms to operationalize upgrades. Capacity providers have an incentive to delay upgrades until near the end of the sales horizon as decisions can be then made with full or near full information. This suggests that upgrades should be given to those who book late, but this strategy creates an incentive for customers to delay bookings in the hope of increasing the probability of an upgrade. An alternative mechanism is to keep track of early bookings and target those for upgrades. Other mechanisms may reward instead loyal customers.
As implicit price reductions, upgrades and upsells have long term effects through customers' expectation formations. Products that are frequently upgraded may become more attractive. Formally, this implies a change over time in the specification and the parameters of the choice model for each individual customer. From a practical perspective, customers who would normally choose high quality products may decide to purchase lower quality products in the expectation that those would be upgraded, further increasing the imbalance between demand and supply. Situations with systematic imbalances between demand and supply are good candidates for price optimization which improves profits and at the same time reduces the need for upgrades and upsells. A full study of the optimality of upgrades under dynamic expectation formations is a topic for future research, together with strategic capacity planning with capacity allocation, upgrades, upsells and pricing done at the tactical level.
A Appendix
In this Appendix we first present the connection between the stochastic and the deterministic demand model used in Section 2. We use the notation of the paper but also expand it as necessary to present the stochastic model and the results. In particular, we flesh out two dual based heuristics for the stochastic problem. Secondly, we briefly explain the connection between the stochastic formulation for the customer choice demand model with price freedom and the corresponding non-linear program analyzed in Section 3. Thirdly, we extend the discussion and some of the results on fairness from Section 2 to the case when the products consume more than one resource.
A.1 Stochastic Formulation for the Independent Demand Model
We assume that the product demands follow independent Poisson processes with rates {λ k }, k = 1, . . . , n. We assume without loss of generality that the sales horizon is T = 1, so the expected demand for product k is d k = λ k T = λ k . The n products consume m resources according to the m × n incidence matrix A, so that the k-th column of A, say A k , denotes the vector of resources consumed by product k. The vector of initial capacities is c and the vector of prices is p.
We will write an approximate discrete time dynamic program and then take the limit to formulate the problem in continuous time and obtain the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equations. To this end, we select the time increment ∆t small enough so that n k=1 λ k ∆t << 1. This allows us to write an approximate discrete time dynamic programming formulation for the stochastic problem by interpreting λ k ∆t << 1 as the probability that a demand arrives for product k over an interval of time ∆t. Let V (x, t) be the expected revenue over the last t units of time before the end of the sales horizon when the inventory at time t is
x.
Without upgrades, the value function V (x, t) can be computed recursively via
(19) with boundary conditions V (x, 0) = V (0, t) = 0, x ≥ 0 and V (x, 0) = −∞ if x has negative components. Notice that a request for one unit of product k arrives with probability λ k ∆t and it is optimal to accept it if and only if p k + V (x − A k , t − ∆t) ≥ V (x, t − ∆t). With probability 1 − n j=1 λ j ∆t no demand arrives, so the inventory stays at x and the time moves to t − ∆t. The term o(∆t) captures higher order terms that go to zero faster than ∆t. The typical discrete time dynamic program is an approximation as it ignores the term o(∆t).
Rearranging terms we obtain:
Taking the limit ∆t → 0 we obtain the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation:
with boundary conditions V (x, 0) = V (0, t) = 0. This tells us that the marginal value of time at state (x, t) is equal to the expected revenue in excess of marginal value.
The use of upgrades allows the decision maker to accept a request for product k and fulfill it with any product in V k . The product can be delivered either at the time of sale or at the end of the horizon. The HJB equation for the case when products are delivered at the time of sale is given by
with boundary conditions V (x, 0) = V (0, t) = 0. Notice that adding upgrades to formulation (21) gives the decision maker the flexibility of fulfilling a sale of product k with the product j ∈ V k with the smallest marginal displacement cost ∆V j (x, t). For upgradeable products k ∈ {1, . . . , u} we have V k = {k} ∪ U k with U k = ∅, whereas for non-upgradeable products k ∈ {u + 1, . . . , n} we have
Alternatively, upgrades may be postponed until the end of the horizon, as is the case when reservation systems are used. This allows the decision maker to accept requests for upgradeable products while postponing the decision of how they are going to be fulfilled.
It is critical, however, that the admission control rule is such that it is feasible to fulfill all accepted requests at the end of the sales horizon. This formulation can be accomplished by expanding the state space to (x, y, t) , where y ∈ Z u is the vector of requests for upgradeable products that have been already accepted and must be fulfilled at the end of the horizon. Initially (x, y, t) = (c, 0, 1), and y k increases by one every time a product k ∈ {1, . . . , u} is accepted. The HJB equation is now given by
where y, t) , where 1 k is a vector of dimension u with one in component k and zero for all other components.
At the end of the horizon when t = 0, we need to decide whether there exists a feasible allocation of the accepted upgradeable products y with the remaining capacity x. Let A denote the feasible set. Then (x, y) ∈ A if x ≥ 0 and there exists a feasible allocation of upgrades. We will give a more precise description of A in the next section. The boundary conditions are given by V (x, y, 0) = 0 if (x, y) ∈ A, and V (x, y, 0) = −∞ otherwise.
A.1.1 Approximate Dynamic Programming
It is well known that the HJB equation can be equivalently stated as a minimization problem. It is possible to restrict the class of functions in this minimization problem to obtain an upper bound on the value function. Indeed, we can use affine functions as an approximation (Zhang and Adelman, 2007) . For example, we can use the approximation V (x, t) W (x, t) = µ x + βt for the case where upgrades are decided at the time of sale, or the approximation based on the affine value function V (x, y, t) W (x, y, t) = µ x − ν y + βt when upgrades are decided at the end of the horizon. Both these approximations to the dynamic programs (1) and (2) lead to formulations that are equivalent to the dual of the linear programming maximization problem (1) in the paper. Moreover, heuristics based on the solution to (1) or its dual can be shown to be asymptotically optimal by mimicking the proofs in Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) and Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) .
We will now present a step by step proof of the connection between the model when upgrades are decided at the end of the horizon with the optimization problem (1) in the paper. The minimization problem for this case is given by min V (c, 0, 1) subject to
where all functions V (x, y, t) that are differentiable in the time variable are admissible.
We now restrict the value function to be affine in the state space, i.e., we restrict V (x, y, t) to be of the form W (x, y, t) = µ x − ν y + βt. W (c, 0, 1) = min µ c + β
Since the objective function is increasing in β, it is optimal to set β = Let z k be the vector with components (z kj ), j ∈ V k , for k = 1, . . . , u. In addition, we will need vectors e k of dimensions |V k | for k = 1, . . . , u, with ones in all components. Finally, we let B k be the matrix consisting of columns of the resource matrix A corresponding to the products in V k , k = 1, . . . , u. With this notation, the feasibility constraints for membership in A reduce to e k z k = y k for k = 1, . . . , u, and 
Substituting into (25) leads to the program Fix µ and notice that we want to set θ k as small as possible, since the objective is increasing in θ. However, the constraint tells us that θ k ≥ p k − µ A j for all j ∈ V k and θ k ≥ 0. Therefore, the optimal value is θ k = (p k − min j∈V k µ A j ) + , for all k = 1, . . . , n.
The dual of (1) therefore is equivalent to the program
and this is identical to program (30) as claimed.
A.1.3 Bid Price Heuristics
Solving the dual for µ ≥ 0 suggests the following bid-price heuristic: Compute ν based on equation (29). Accept a request for product k ∈ {1, . . . , u} at state (x, y) if p k ≥ ν k and (x, y ) ∈ A, where y j = y j for j = k and y k = y k + 1. Otherwise, reject the request. Accept a request for product k ∈ {u + 1, . . . , n} if p k ≥ µ A k and if (x − A k , y) ∈ A. Otherwise, reject the request. This heuristic postpones the allocation until the end of the horizon.
Using the results in Talluri and van Ryzin (1998) , it is possible to show that this heuristic is asymptotically optimal.
Suppose we desire a heuristic to allocate upgrades at the time of sale. We can adapt the previous heuristic starting with an allocation z = 0. Suppose the current state is (t, x) and suppose that z represents the allocation of all prior arrivals into the system. When a request for product k arrives, reject the request if the set k(x, z) = {j ∈ V k : x j > e j Bz} is empty. Otherwise, accept the request, allocate it to product j = argmin{µ A j : j ∈ k(x, z)}, update z k,j = z k,j + 1 and x = x − A j . Repeat the procedure until the end of the horizon. Notice that this guarantees that we end with a feasible solution.
A.2 Stochastic Formulation for the Customer Choice Demand Model
Using the notation in the paper, the HJB equation for the pricing problem under the choice demand model without upgrades with market size M = λT , is given by
with boundary conditions V (0, t) = V (x, 0) = 0 when x ≥ 0 and V (x, 0) = −∞ otherwise.
The affine approximation W (x, t) = µ x + βt leads to the linear program W (c, T ) = min µ c + βT
where the constraints on µ and β follow from the boundary conditions W (x, 0) ≥ 0 for x ≥ 0 and W (0, t) ≥ 0.
Since the objective function is increasing in β it is optimal to select the smallest feasible β and this is given by β = max 
A.3 Fairness in Upgrades
In this section we extend the discussion and some of the results on fairness from Section 2 to the case A = I when the products consume more than one resource.
Let ω j , j = 1, . . . , n be the core values of the n products. Notice that the core values may differ from the prices of the products as the latter may be influenced by capacity. We will make the intuitive assumption that j ∈ V k implies ω j ≥ ω k . 8
Intuitively, a solution z is fair if any upgrade given to a consumer of product j ∈ U k has a higher core value than any upgrade given to product k customers. More precisely, we have the following: Definition A.1 An upgrade solution z is fair if
We next define two properties of upgrade models. Let R f be the optimal revenue subject to the fairness constraint. In general, R f ≤ R and a strict inequality is possible as fair solutions are more constrained. The following proposition gives conditions under which R f = R. Proposition A.1 If the upgrade model is both transitive and inductive then R f = R.
Proof. Let z be any optimal solution to the LP problem. If z is not already fair, the following steps will produce a fair solution with the same revenue.
Step 1: If k = u + 1 stop. Otherwise construct the set S k = {l ∈ U k : max{ω j : z kj > 0} > min{ω i : z li > 0}}.
If S k = ∅ set k = k + 1 and repeat this step; otherwise go to Step 2.
Step 2: Let l k be the product in S k with the largest index. Then there is a j ∈ U k and i ∈ U l k such that w j > w i . Compute min(z kj , z k l ,i ), upgrade this number of units of product l k from i to j and demote the same number of units of product k from j to i. Update z and go to Step 1.
Every visit to
Step 2 corrects a detected violation of the fairness property while keeping the solution feasible and the revenue constant. Since there are at most a finite number of violations, the set S k eventually reduces to the empty set which allows us to move to k + 1, thus guaranteing that the algorithm converges in finite time. To see that all of the operations are legitimate, notice that since ω l k ≤ ω i < ω j , j ∈ V k and l k ∈ V k , by the inductive property it follows that j ∈ V l k . Hence j is a potential upgrade for product l k customers, and it is possible to upgrade min(z k,j , z l k ,i ) units of product l k from i to j. Similarly, since i ∈ V l k and l k ∈ V k , by the transitivity property it follows that i ∈ V k . Hence i is a potential upgrade for product k customers, and it is possible to demote min(z k,j , z l k ,i ) units of product k from j to i.
